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Possibilities of an “Indigenous” Identity 
in French Polynesia and New Caledonia 
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The adoption of the United Nations (UN) Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples in 2007 was seen by many people throughout the 
world (including a number of anthropologists1) as a hopeful step in this 
postcolonial world in the making. And yet, as this article attempts to 
show, in the cases of French Polynesia and New Caledonia, the category 
“indigenous” is problematic and full of complexities.
In French Polynesia and New Caledonia, the “indigenous strategy”—in 
reference to the world indigenous movement and UN indigenous rights 
instruments—is a relatively new one in the struggle to recover sover-
eignty.2 Individuals and volunteer associations only began to explore the 
possibilities of this strategy in the mid-1990s, and it continues to hold a 
marginal place in the political field of the French territories, particularly 
in French Polynesia. 
As Florence, a Tahitian woman in her late fifties, stated, “People do not 
recognize themselves as an indigenous people, do not want to be an indig-
enous people . . . since indigenous means subhuman” (pers comm, Tahiti, 
May 2011).3 This quotation clearly shows the negative connotation that 
the category “indigenous” can carry in the French territories of Ocea-
nia. A large number of Mā‘ohi people have no desire to use the label for 
themselves, and, unlike people in many other parts of the world, do not 
see the “indigenous strategy” as useful in the struggle for decolonization 
or sovereignty. As for the Kanak people, the situation is slowly changing.
How can we explain this reluctance, in the context of the progress made 
in recent years by indigenous peoples around the world in terms of recog-
nition? This study explores the impact that the international indigenous 
peoples’ movement and the adoption of the UN Declaration on the Rights 
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of Indigenous Peoples have had on strategies of decolonization or sover-
eignty in French Polynesia and New Caledonia. I consider how indigene-
ity and indigenous rights are understood and enacted locally, drawing on 
local voices and actions within a local and national context. What does 
being an “indigenous people” mean? What does the “indigenous strat-
egy” achieve, or fail to achieve, for locals? In what contexts and for what 
 reasons is the “indigenous strategy” appealing? For whom? While this 
article is intended to be comparative, my main emphasis is on French Poly-
nesia since others have already discussed how the “indigenous strategy” 
has been used in New Caledonia in recent years (among them Demmer 
2007; Graff 2012; Horowitz 2004, 2009, 2010, 2012; Monnerie 2005; 
Trépied 2012a).
First, I examine how the political field has historically been struc-
tured in French Polynesia and New Caledonia. As we will see, local and 
national contexts are configured in an extremely different fashion than in 
the anglophone Pacific, the rest of the former British Empire, and Latin 
America, where people first came together around the category “indig-
enous peoples” from the 1960s onward. These differences will continue 
to come to light throughout this article. 
Some Elements of the Political Backgrounds
In current French public debates about a postcolonial France in the mak-
ing, the situations of the Mā‘ohi of French Polynesia and the Kanak of New 
Caledonia—along with those of the Amerindians of Guyana, the Maho-
rais of Mayotte, and the Pacific Islanders of Wallis and Futuna—are vastly 
overlooked. As Benoît Trépied has pointed out, “There is an  important 
blind spot in all these discussions of the French (post)colonial context: 
the distinct situation of formerly colonized native subjects who remained 
under French sovereignty even after the wave of independence that began 
in the 1960s” (2012b). This is also true of academic scholarship, despite 
the “staggering surge in publication and debate” (Stoler 2011, 123) on 
French colonial history in France over the last decade. Trépied added that 
these populations “occupy a paradoxical position—at once marginal and 
central—in the French postcolonial debate. They are marginal insofar as 
their small numbers in the metropole, compared to the children of African 
immigrants and descendants of slaves originating from overseas territories, 
contribute directly to their social and cultural invisibility at the national 
level. Yet they are central because their historic trajectories remind us so 
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forcefully of the eminently colonial matrix of the category of ‘overseas’ 
[in reference to the French ‘overseas territories’], which makes the ‘indig-
enous question’ very relevant in today’s France” (2012b).
On 18 May 2013, however, a decision of the UN General Assembly 
placed this French colonial legacy under a bright spotlight: a consensus 
resolution, tabled by three Pacific Island states (Nauru, Tuvalu, and Solo-
mon Islands), was adopted, which added French Polynesia back to the UN 
list of territories that should be decolonized (see Gonschor 2013).4 With 
this resolution, the UN General Assembly affirmed “the inalienable right 
of the people of French Polynesia to self-determination and independence” 
under the UN Charter and asked France to “facilitate rapid progress . . .
towards a self-determination process.” The re-listing of French Polynesia 
on the UN decolonization list has been championed by Tahitians Oscar 
Temaru, president of the independentist party Tavini Huiraatira and five-
time president of French Polynesia between 2004 and 2013 (epf 2013), 
and Richard Tuheiava, a member of the French Senate representing French 
Polynesia between 2008 and 2014 and deputy member of the French Poly-
nesian Assembly since spring 2013 (also a member of the Tavini Huiraa-
tira; see Massau 2011 for a discussion of his position on this issue). 
In May 2013, the French minister of foreign affairs reacted promptly 
and vehemently to the General Assembly’s resolution, taken in a session 
that was boycotted by France’s UN ambassador. In the minister’s words, 
the resolution “constitutes complete interference” and goes against the 
democratic choices of French Polynesians. In the general elections on 21 
April and 5 May 2013, President Temaru was defeated and the electors 
gave a “clear majority to the representatives more favorable to the actual 
autonomy status” (fd 2013), including the president of the autonomous 
party (Tahoera‘a Huiraatira), Gaston Flosse.5 
The newly elected president of French Polynesia has not missed a 
chance to preempt a debate on self-determination in the French territory. 
At the 44th Pacific Islands Forum (held in Majuro in the Marshall Islands 
from 3 to 6 September 2013), Flosse reminded the assembled leaders of 
the resolution approved by the French Polynesian Assembly (46 votes for 
and 11 against) on 17 August 2013. The resolution states: “The Assembly 
of French Polynesia recalls the right of French Polynesia to live within 
the statutory framework that French Polynesia chose, that is Autonomy 
within the French Republic” (see Garot 2013).
Although the issue is part of an ongoing debate on the local scene, the 
public debate around it was short-lived in metropolitan France. 
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As for New Caledonia, it has been back on the UN list since 1986 
(Mohamed-Gaillard 2008; Regnault 2013). Both French territories are 
thus now on the agenda of the Special Committee on the Situation with 
regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Inde-
pendence of Colonial Countries and Peoples (also known as the Special 
Committee on Decolonization or c-24). The Special Committee was estab-
lished in 1961 by the UN General Assembly (Resolution 1514 [xv] of 
14 December 1960) in a historical and political context entirely differ-
ent from today: the context of full decolonization and independence for 
many colonies in the aftermath of World War II (for historical details, see 
 Regnault 2013; Gonschor 2013).
France took formal possession of New Caledonia in 1853 and it became 
a penal and settler colony. The New Caledonian population today is com-
posed of various ethnic groups. Those who identify as Kanak, the descen-
dants of the original population, account for 40.3 percent of the popula-
tion; those who identify as European, 29.2 percent; those who identify as 
Wallisians and Futunians, 8.7 percent; and those who identify as métis or 
who say they belong to many “communities,” 8.3 percent (isee 2009).6 
Historically, the watchword for Kanak leaders of what started in 1979 
as the Front Indépendantiste (fi, Independentist Front) and then in 1984 
became the Front de Libération Nationale Kanak et Socialiste (flnks, 
Kanak Socialist Front for National Liberation) has been socialist Kanak 
independence. This notion has received strong electoral support from 
Kanak voters—between 70 percent and 80 percent of their vote (Soriano 
2001). The emphasis has been on full sovereignty, following the model 
developed during the first wave of decolonization in Africa and Asia and in 
the young states of Fiji, Papua New Guinea, and Vanuatu, which obtained 
independence in 1970, 1975, and 1980, respectively. New Caledonia is a 
society marked by diverse forms of segregation—for example, the Kanak 
population has experienced the indigénat regime (repealed in 1946; see 
Merle 2004; Muckle 2012) and a policy of cantonnement, the practice of 
confining the Kanak population to reserves. Local politics here has been 
characterized by a sharp opposition between two camps: independentists 
on one side and loyalists—loyal defenders of the French Republic—on the 
other. The political divide tends to follow racial or ethnic lines even though 
in practice the reality has always been far more complex, and there has 
always been a “reliable Kanak ‘loyalist’ minority” (Trépied 2012a, 2013). 
The violent uprisings of the 1980s known as “les Événements” (the 
Events) led to two agreements: the Matignon Accords in 1988 and the 
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Nouméa Accord in 1998.7 Since then the French territory has been involved 
in an ongoing process of “decolonization,” the term used in the Nouméa 
Accord. The originality of this accord lies in the fact that it laid out in 
advance (and irreversibly) the step-by-step transfers of state powers to 
the New Caledonian local government. This process could lead, at term, 
to full independence after a referendum on self-determination, scheduled 
to take place sometime between 2014 and 2018. In view of the political 
divide mentioned above and the light demographic weight of the Kanak 
population, however, this outcome seems more and more unlikely. In fact, 
now that a wide array of state powers have already been transferred to the 
New Caledonian government, numerous possibilities for the form of the 
destin commun (common destiny) of New Caledonian people are being 
explored, offering various degrees of autonomy. The country stands at a 
historic crossroads.
The history of French Polynesia is quite different. Between 1842 and 
1880, parts of what is now French Polynesian territory were declared a 
French protectorate. France was in power but left a measure of auton-
omy to the indigenous chiefs in certain areas. In contrast to New Cale-
donia, French Polynesia has not suffered settler colonialism, and some 
members of the Polynesian population—those of Pomare’s kingdom—
were given the status of citizen when it formally became a colony at 
the 1880 annexation, even though discrimination was soon reintroduced 
in dealing with these citoyens indigènes (indigenous citizens) (Trémon 
2013). France retained significant authority and even tightened its con-
trol over the territory after the Second World War, particularly during 
the period that saw the installation of the Centre d’Expérimentation du 
Pacifique (cep, Pacific Experimentation Center) and the nuclear bomb 
tests, which started in 1966 (see Gonschor 2013). But since the end of 
these tests in 1996, France has gradually withdrawn from French Poly-
nesia, progressively granting the territory more autonomy and reducing 
money transfers. Until the end of the 1970s, there was a split among the 
population of Polynesian origin—which makes up more than 80 percent 
of the population8—between those who favored direct administration 
by France and those who demanded more autonomy. The new status of 
autonomie de gestion (literally, autonomy of management) granted by 
France in 1977 opened the door for the creation of yet another division 
between “those autonomists who hoped to remain within the constitu-
tional framework of the French Republic while disposing of a system 
of greatly decentralized power and the ‘independentists’ who advocate 
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total sovereignty” (Al Wardi 2010, 140; see also Al Wardi 2009; Trémon 
2006). 
In French Polynesia, the opposition between pro-independence and 
pro-autonomy stances has been personified by the two metua (fathers), 
Oscar Temaru and Gaston Flosse, for nearly half a century. I was in the 
field in July 2013, shortly after Flosse’s re-election.9 People were resigned, 
and I repeatedly heard comments similar to the following: “There is no 
alternative as long as the old lion [Flosse] and his longtime rival are there. 
They don’t leave any space for young leaders to assert themselves and for 
visions of alternative futures to emerge.” 
Beyond the traditional political parties and channels, however, a new 
way of framing the claims for increased autonomy and the restoration 
of sovereignty has been explored by segments of the Kanak and Tahitian 
populations in recent years. Volunteer associations have been at the fore-
front of advocacy for indigenous rights. These people affirm their identity 
as autochtones (indigenous people),10 and some of them insist on their 
special status or rights in reference to the world indigenous movement and 
the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
Pacific Islanders and the World Indigenous Movement:  
The Beginning
Māori leaders from New Zealand and Aborigine leaders from Australia, 
along with Amerindians and Inuit leaders, were the first to bring their 
case to international attention and to appeal (in the 1970s) to the United 
Nations for the protection of their rights as “indigenous peoples” under 
international law (Minde 1996; Niezen 2003). Representatives of other 
peoples from settler states who missed the opportunities of the first wave 
of decolonization in the 1960s, such as Hawaiians and the Torres Strait 
Islanders of Australia, who also define themselves as indigenous, rapidly 
joined their ranks. 
Throughout the years, these leaders made themselves heard, with the 
support of human rights activists, organizations such as churches and 
sympathetic nonindigenous nongovernmental organizations, as well as 
certain states (see Bellier 2003; Morin 2009). This led to the creation of 
the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations (wgip) in 1982, the 
UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues in 2000, and the adoption of 
the declaration in 2007. This last event received fairly significant public 
attention throughout the world, including from the main (predominantly 
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anglophone) media in the South Pacific. The declaration was also featured 
widely on the Internet. 
Pacific Islanders from the French territories came late and only irregu-
larly to the UN meetings about indigenous rights. The International Year 
of the World’s Indigenous People, 1993, was the first year that two Kanak 
representatives, who were also members of flnks, participated in a wgip 
meeting (Morin 2008). Locally, 1993 was also the founding year of the 
Association pour la Célébration de l’Année du Peuple Indigène en Kanaky 
(acapik, Association for the Celebration of the Year of the Indigenous 
People in Kanaky), which in 1995 became the Conseil National des Droits 
du Peuple Autochtone (cndpa, National Council for the Rights of Indig-
enous People) (Demmer 2007; Graff 2012; Monnerie 2005). Stéphanie 
Graff linked this early exploration of the “indigenous strategy” to divi-
sions among Kanak independentists following the signing of the Mati-
gnon Accords (2012, 75). Denis Monnerie emphasized the local impact of 
UN indigenous rights activities on local Kanak activism in the 1990s and 
drew attention to the change of vocabulary used to speak about the Kanak 
people: celebrations and claims that were first framed around the peuple 
indigène were reframed using the term peuples autochtones (2005, 20). 
As I have shown in the case of the Māori of New Zealand (Gagné 2011), 
this kind of vocabulary shift has become more widespread as the world 
indigenous peoples’ movement makes gains and attracts the attention of 
the media and academics.11 However, as mentioned by Graff (2012, 68), 
up until 2001—that is, until the UN meetings concerning indigenous peo-
ples’ rights came to New York with the creation of the Permanent Forum 
on Indigenous Issues12—the presence of Kanak representatives was only 
 sporadic. The Nouméa Accord of 1998 (which has no equivalent in the 
Polynesian case) has been instrumental in catalyzing “indigenous” poli-
tics, as shown later in this article.
Like their Kanak counterparts, French Polynesian people came late to 
indigenous rights meetings and only irregularly. Françoise Morin traced 
the first attendance to the World Conference on Human Rights, held in 
1993 in Vienna (2008). The conference, which took place during the Inter-
national Year of the World’s Indigenous People, recommended that the 
General Assembly proclaim an international decade of the world’s indige-
nous peoples. Gabriel Tetiarahi, a representative of the Ligue Polynésienne 
Indépendante des Droits de l’Homme (the Polynesian Independent League 
of Human Rights)—also called Te Hui Tiama—attended the conference 
and was asked to give the inaugural speech on indigenous peoples’ rights 
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(ldt 2013). This first experience led to his attendance at the wgip the fol-
lowing year (Morin 2008). Tetiarahi was the representative of Hiti Tau,13 
le Conseil National du Pays Maohi (National Council of the Maohi Coun-
try), a Tahiti-based association that he founded in 1992 and that is part 
of the regional network Pacific Islands Association of Non-Governmental 
Organisations (piango). 
Here is an excerpt from Tetiarahi’s statement before the UN wgip in 
1995: 
Indigenous Peoples of the Pacific firmly refuse to suffer the consequences of a 
State’s need to exteriorize its anguish. . . . “The earth is our mother,” say Indig-
enous Peoples who all agree on this essential idea. . . . In the framework of the 
arms race between major powers, our Shoshonee brothers from the Nevada 
also suffered from the fundamentally counter-nature of nuclear testing and its 
destructive effects (610 of them). Their lands, like in Moruroa, have been rav-
aged by enormous holes created in the Earth, some of it approximates the size 
of football fields. Other Indigenous Peoples and their environment are directly 
being threatened by continuous exposure to radioactivity: Haudenosaunee (six 
Iroquois Nations of North America) are exposed to radioactive waste left over 
from the Manhattan project; Inuit in Alaska; Indigenous Peoples in Australia, 
etc. (Hiti Tau 1995)
What is particularly interesting is how this Mā‘ohi representative empha-
sized the strong bonds between his people and the indigenous peoples of 
the United States and Australia, stressing their common link to the land, 
to Mother Earth, as well as their common suffering and threat by the great 
powers’ arms race. This has been typical of the world indigenous move-
ment from the start. The frustration engendered by the inability of indig-
enous peoples to obtain justice from their own national governments has 
led self-defined indigenous peoples to look beyond their national borders 
and establish commonalities and international solidarity networks with 
other indigenous groups, as well as nonindigenous parties who are sensi-
tive to the indigenous cause (Gagné 2012). These networks have allowed 
them to use international forums, especially through the UN system, to 
air their grievances and demands. As Tetiarahi stated recently, “The UN is 
first and foremost a platform to assert our rights” (ldt 2013). According 
to my understanding, he saw the indigenous rights meetings as being only 
one of these platforms. Over the years, he has participated in a number 
of international, trans-Pacific, and European forums and organizations, 
working on sustainable development, “fighting against nuclear colonial-
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ism, nuclear racism, and nuclear terrorism in the South Pacific” (Peace 
Boat website 2008; see also ldt 2013) and calling for self-determination 
or full sovereignty for Mā‘ohi. 
In the mid to late 2000s, Mareva Neti de Montluc also attended UN 
indigenous rights meetings; more specifically, she attended the UN Perma-
nent Forum on Indigenous Issues (unpfii). The unpfii has held yearly ses-
sions at the UN headquarters in New York since 2002. To my knowledge, 
she and Gabriel Tetiarahi are the only two Tahitians to have attended 
those meetings to date. De Montluc participated in at least three of the 
unpfii sessions, as a representative of different local associations, and 
spoke out on three particular issues: (1) in 2007, she spoke about the 
nineteenth-century “treaties” that bind France and Tahitian chiefs; (2) in 
2008, as a representative of Hiti Tau (the same association that Tetiarahi 
represented a decade earlier), she addressed an issue dear to her predeces-
sor—nuclear testing and its effect on the southern Pacific archipelagos and 
their populations—and asked for the nuclear powers to take responsibil-
ity for the harmful effects of their actions; and (3) in 2010, she spoke on 
French Polynesia’s right to self-determination (UN 2007, 2008, 2010). 
In 2008, de Montluc was elected (along with her Kanak counterpart 
Jean-Yves M’Bouéri) to the management board of the Coordination 
Autochtone Francophone (caf, Indigenous Francophone Coordination) 
as a representative for the Pacific region. In the 2000s, the French branch 
of the International World Group for Indigenous Affairs (iwgia)—the 
Groupe International de Travail pour les Peuples Autochtones (gitpa)—
was instrumental in the creation and founding of the caf, whose objec-
tives were first set in 2004 during the third session of the unpfii (gitpa 
2009). Members of the gitpa board of directors supported and even 
helped secure travel funding for individuals such as de Montluc or Sarimin 
Boengkih (a Kanak representative who attended caf meetings) in their 
participation in indigenous forums.14
Having examined these instances (through a media analysis, informal 
discussions, and semi-directed interviews with people in the field since 
2005), I found it clear that the presence of Mā‘ohi and Kanak voices at 
UN indigenous rights forums was made possible mainly through individ-
ual initiative and sometimes with the support of foreign nongovernmental 
organizations. What is striking is that beyond the small volunteer associa-
tions they represent at the United Nations, their work as representatives 
has remained mostly unknown on the local scale, and they did not make 
any particular effort to inform the population about the UN debates and 
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possibilities concerning indigenous issues until 2002 in the case of New 
Caledonia and until after 2010 in the case of French Polynesia. Not only 
is their action invisible, but, as novelist Chantal Spitz stated in an article 
in Littérama‘ohi (in a special issue on indigeneity and indigenous peoples), 
“The [adoption] of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples by 
the UN General Assembly on 13 September 2007 almost went unnoticed 
in our country [French Polynesia] although it had been celebrated by the 
indigenous peoples of the world” (2011, 94).15 This is also true in New 
Caledonia. How do we explain this situation?
Vanina, a research participant who sees potential benefits for her people 
in the UN rights of indigenous peoples, explained why the indigenous 
rights strategy has not been taken up by people in French Polynesia: “The 
notion of ‘indigenous,’ from the French mould, is something that is. . . .
Some view it as a pejorative word. It’s as if for us, with regard to our own 
identity . . . certain people have not quite got to the heart of what they find 
so shocking in this word” (pers comm, Tahiti, May 2007). 
As noted earlier, for many people in French Polynesia and New Cale-
donia, “indigenous means subhuman” (Florence, pers comm, Tahiti, May 
2011). Indeed, it means being a second-class citizen—it refers back to 
the inferior legal status and restricted rights of the indigènes, the French 
native subjects, in comparison to the full rights and status of the citizens 
of the French colonial empire from 1887 to 1946. And this conception 
prevails because of the symbolic and historical importance of the cate-
gory indigènes (Trépied and Guyon 2013) and in spite of the exceptional 
situation of segments of the French Polynesian population, as mentioned 
earlier. It is strengthened when they consider the living conditions and 
extreme marginalization of some who identify as indigenous today, such as 
certain aboriginal communities in Australia and Canada. As some people 
in Tahiti told me, they cannot identify with these marginalized communi-
ties. “We call it pride!” said Florence (pers comm, Tahiti, May 2011). The 
facts that Mā‘ohi people form the large majority of the French Polynesian 
population, and that the autonomy status gives their local governments 
a large measure of autonomy in many domains within France, certainly 
account in part for this. Florence even spoke of a certain arrogance of 
her people that often prevents them from collaborating with other Pacific 
Island peoples on diverse issues. 
The poet Isidore Hiro (brother of the late poet and playwright Henri 
Hiro, who was a key player in the cultural renaissance from the 1970s 
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onward that embraced Mā‘ohi identity and values) spoke to the ambiguity 
of the word autochtones (indigenous) for Tahitians:
As far as I can remember, it was at the end of the 1980s that I heard the word 
“autochtone” for the first time. What strikes me is how its usage has spread 
today. At the time, we could no longer understand who we were exactly, where 
we were and how we could locate ourselves in relation to this new expression: 
“autochtone.” Who was this person that we call “autochtone”? . . . As I under-
stood it, we were not Tahitians anymore, we were not Paumotu, we were not 
Mangarevians, or inhabitants of the Austral Islands, neither Maupiti, neither 
other peoples from the Leeward islands, neither Maiào, neither “Mooreane-
ans”—it meant that we were not Maòhi anymore, but rather autochtones, 
people from this country. . . . But who? . . . Where are they from? . . . Who are 
their parents? . . . All these questions have no importance, they were born in 
this country, so they are from this country. There is nothing to question, we 
shouldn’t try to understand, that’s it . . . Can we trust this? (2011, 37; ellipses 
in the French original) 
Clearly, Hiro is very suspicious of the notion of an indigenous identity. 
For him, its ambiguity lies in the fact that it could be used to identify two 
categories of people: those he calls les autochtones natifs (2011, 38)—an 
expression that, according to him, refers to anyone born in the country, 
whether or not one’s parents or ancestors are from there—and those he 
calls autochtones de souche (2011, 38), an expression which, for him, 
refers to the first or original inhabitants of the country—that is, mem-
bers of the Mā‘ohi ethnic group. In the first case, “one is born in this 
country, he has lived here,” and “one’s parents and ancestors came from 
elsewhere,” and, in the second case, “one has a visceral connection with 
the land and one’s ancestors” (Hiro 2011, 39). This distinction seems very 
important to him and, as we can see, has important political implications. 
I believe that the key to understanding this distinction is to be found in 
the “French mould,” as suggested by Vanina above. More specifically, it 
can be found in the French conception of citizenship and the public debates 
that surround it: French citizenship is founded upon the “right of birth-
place” (jus soli). Being a citizen of the French Republic thus means being 
a member of a political community, which has no ethnic foundation and 
has nothing to do with ancestry and a “blood right” (jus sanguinis) (see, 
eg, Weil 2008). Being a French citizen involves a sense of being autochtone 
to France.16 The idea is also perpetuated by French mainlanders who have 
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migrated to a French overseas territory, as well as by their children who 
were born in the overseas territories, to insist on their right to be there 
and their legitimacy as citizens of that territory. We sometimes hear such 
arguments in French Polynesia—to justify titles to land, for instance, or 
participation in local life and politics, but also to insist on their rights and 
those of their children to stay in the territory if it achieves independence as 
a sovereign state. The same has often happened in New Caledonia as well. 
Arguments of this kind arose around the sensitive issue of the freezing of 
the electorate for the territorial elections of 2009 and 2014 as well as the 
forthcoming referendum on self-determination, a cornerstone of the Nou-
méa Accord of 1998 (Chappell 2007).17 In my opinion, this is why we see 
a need for Isidore Hiro to create two categories of autochtones.
What is also striking in the quotation from Hiro above is that he is 
dubious about the category autochtone because it comes from overseas. 
This echoes many comments I heard while in the field in Tahiti. Once 
again, something is imposed from outside, like so many appellations that 
arise from the colonial history such as “French Polynesians” or simply 
“Polynesians” (see Saura 2008). The category autochtone is also seen 
as problematic because it is foreign to their language and too abstract: 
according to Hiro, something about their self-definition is lost with it. As 
he said in a recent interview: “I am born in Mo‘orea, my umbilical cord is 
on Mo‘orea island, my placenta is on Mo‘orea, I myself am not a Tahitian, 
I am a ‘Mo‘orea-nian’” (Tahiti Infos 2013). And it is as a “Mo‘orea-nian” 
that he belongs to the Mā‘ohi people. It seems to me, therefore, that self-
identifying as autochtones consists, for Hiro, of erasing all particulari-
ties: those related to his island of origin and those linked to his national 
identity. 
On the complexity of the term, Spitz added: “Still today, the notion of 
‘autochtonie’ remains vague and unclear for a broad segment of society. It 
is as vague and confused as the meaning given to the word Mā‘ohi. Even 
worse, autochtonie is often presented as meaning exclusion, communitari-
anism [in French communautarisme, used in this context to denote  ethnic 
isolationism or sectarianism] or independence” (2011, 98). Knowing 
that for some segments of the population of French Polynesia (and New 
Caledonia) independence is associated with political uncertainty, poverty, 
racism, exclusion, and even civil unrest, indigeneity suffers from a nega-
tive public perception. As for the word Mā‘ohi and Mā‘ohi identity, they 
have been the spearhead of the Tahitian movement of cultural renaissance 
since the end of the 1970s (Saura 2004, 2008). For twenty years, people 
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have agreed with the definition given by one of its leaders, Duro Raapoto: 
“Maohi is the exact opposite of hutu painu (seed adrift). It is generally 
defined in the following way: common, indigenous—that is, not foreign” 
(1978, 115, quoted in Saura 2008, 121). In the last decade, however, the 
word has been the subject of sometimes fierce debate about its etymol-
ogy, precise meaning, local (de)anchoring, Tahiticentrism, and appropri-
ate usage in reference to human beings (see Saura 2008, 133–152 for a 
summary). This speaks volumes about identity politics in French Polynesia 
and political positioning about, among other things, the future of the terri-
tory. For some, the word has lost its original appeal and potential to mobi-
lize people because of these controversies: “[Mā‘ohi] will never be a word 
on which everybody will agree. Never! Then maybe we should not use it 
anymore. . . . we have to find an alternative!” (Florence, pers comm, May 
2011). For Florence, the word autochtones (indigenous) might be such an 
alternative—one that could open new possibilities and unite her people. 
I will turn now to an exploration of the ways in which this notion of 
autochtonie has succeeded (or not) in strengthening the foundations for 
grassroots movements in New Caledonia and French Polynesia in recent 
years, beyond occasional individual participation in UN forums. 
Fertile Ground? Indigenous Grassroots Movements  
in the French Territories of Oceania
Since the Matignon Accords (1988), nickel mining has been central to eco-
nomic development policies in New Caledonia. The agreement was aimed 
at an economic rebalancing of the three provinces, since the Northern and 
Island Provinces, peopled predominantly by Kanak, are underdeveloped 
in comparison to the Southern Province—the administrative and financial 
center under European control (Demmer 2007). Since 1990, the Northern 
Province, where Kanak representatives occupy the main elected positions, 
has become active in the industry and now controls a vast sector (Horo-
witz 2004). 
At the beginning of the 2000s, a particular situation led to a vigorous 
affirmation of the “new Kanak strategy” (Demmer 2007), which used the 
framework of the international indigenous rights movement to articulate 
its demands. A new nickel refinery (first known as Goro Nickel and now 
called Vale Nouvelle-Calédonie), located near the capital city of Nouméa, 
planned to employ a new technology never used before in New Caledonia. 
This method uses “acid under pressure to leach nickel and cobalt from the 
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ore” and is far more polluting (Horowitz 2012, 811). The project sparked 
concerns in the early 2000s among local residents, local elected officials, 
and environmental organizations. One organization, the Kanak volunteer 
association Rhéébù Nùù—which means “eye of the country” (Horowitz 
2012, 812)—was created in 2002 to represent the environmental and eco-
nomic interests of the indigenous people of New Caledonia’s Great South 
region. Over the years, with the help of a French lawyer specializing in 
indigenous rights, Jérôme Bouquet-Elkaïm, the self-identifying indigenous 
group put forward two main demands (in reference to the Draft Declara-
tion on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples):
•  environmental guarantees, in particular on the issue of the discharge 
of heavy metals in the lagoon;
•  the creation of a heritage fund on the principle of free, prior and 
informed consent of indigenous peoples with regards to development 
projects that affect them. (Bouquet-Elkaïm 2006) 
The Comité Autochtone de Gestion des Ressources Naturelles 
(caugern, Indigenous Committee for Natural Resources Management), a 
volunteer association created in 2005 that includes some of the leaders of 
Rhéébù Nùù, extended the indigenous action and demands to the whole 
county. They asked for legal long-term guarantees concerning Kanak asset 
management and ownership in the mining industry as well as financial 
compensation or royalties for the indigenous people (Demmer 2007).
Rhéébù Nùù succeeded in making many direct and indirect gains: in 
2007, it caused the Administrative Tribunal to halt construction of the 
refinery until the company gave additional environmental guarantees. 
Rhéébù Nùù also signed, along with twenty-five customary authorities 
of the Great South and Goro Nickel representatives, the Pacte pour un 
Développement Durable du Grand Sud (the Pact for Sustainable Develop-
ment of the Great South). Points in the pact include “creating a corporate 
foundation to fund local sustainable development initiatives, setting up 
a Consultative Customary Environmental Committee, . . . recruiting and 
training local ‘environmental technicians,’ and implementing an extensive 
reforestation program” (Horowitz 2012, 812). In addition, one of the 
organization’s main leaders, Raphaël Mapou—a dissident flnks leader, 
kingpin of the indigenous movement—was named president of oeil (The 
Eye), an environmental observatory created in 2009 (lnc 2009). 
Collaborations, alliances, and support from outside sources played a 
gagné • brave new words 385
strong role in the “new Kanak strategy” gaining legitimacy, facilitating 
negotiation with the mining company and the New Caledonian govern-
ment and helping self-identified indigenous organizations to achieve some 
of their goals. The indigenous groups have succeeded in attracting inter-
national attention—mainly through local and international networking, 
press releases, demonstrations (including some violent actions at the Goro 
mining site that received media attention), the Internet, and travel over-
seas. The backing these groups received was not always straightforward; 
rather, it was linked to a multifaceted “game” of interests and influences 
(Horowitz 2012). Supporters have included local and overseas environ-
mental organizations; the Customary Senate; the New-Caledonian Green 
Party; the Union Syndicale des Travailleurs Kanaks et Exploités (ustke, 
Trade Union of Kanak and Exploited Workers); the French Ligue Commu-
niste Révolutionnaire (lcr, Revolutionary Communist League); promi-
nent figures of the alter-globalization movement and of the Confédéra-
tion Paysanne (Peasant Confederation, a French agricultural union) such 
as José Bové; indigenous peoples and “ordinary” citizens from around 
the world; and anthropologists and lawyers working on indigenous rights 
(Demmer 2007; Horowitz 2012). 
In French Polynesia, no particular event seems to have created the same 
kind of impetus toward a full-fledged social movement for “indigenous” 
demands. Instead, references to indigeneity and the affirmation of indig-
enous identity and rights were made by only a very small number of vol-
unteer associations and were primarily motivated by cultural production 
(arts and literature, for example) and the preservation of cultural heritage. 
Members of Littérama‘ohi, a literary association created in 2002, have 
spoken of themselves as “indigenous writers.” The association works 
to connect and promote writers from French Polynesia and publishes 
the journal Littérama‘ohi. As of 2010, they have emphasized that their 
objective is to “promote the indigenous literature of French Polynesia” 
(Littérama‘ohi 2013). On 16 October 2010, for example, the group orga-
nized a debate entitled “Indigenous Peoples” during the book fair Lire 
en Polynésie française (Reading in French Polynesia). The following invi-
tation was printed in the fair’s program: “On 13 September 2007, the 
United Nations General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples. Three years later, the indigeneity question concern-
ing the indigenous peoples of French Polynesia has not yet been debated 
in our country. The Littérama‘ohi Group proposes a moment of sharing 
about these themes.” One of the organizers told me afterward, in May 
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2011: “We expected that either people would come and attack us or would 
simply not come . . . and people did not come. . . . No, here, people do 
not recognize themselves as autochtones, do not want to be an indigenous 
people.”  In fact, only about fifteen people attended the event. The texts 
that were read that evening reviewed recent developments in the United 
Nations concerning indigenous peoples’ rights; they were published a year 
later, in October 2011, along with a few other texts, in a special issue of 
Littérama‘ohi titled Autochtonie et peuples autochtones (Indigeneity and 
Indigenous Peoples). Isidore Hiro’s paper was an interesting addition to 
this special issue, illustrating the ambiguity of the notion of indigeneity for 
Mā‘ohi people. 
Since then, the Littérama‘ohi association has continued to use the term 
autochtone from time to time when speaking about their writings and 
activities—for example, in a public reading at the Papeete market in June 
2011 (lnt 2011). Why would they choose to do so? One reason is that 
it certainly tickles local people’s curiosity and may therefore aid in pro-
moting their work on the small French Polynesian book scene. It also 
allows the writers to show the relevance of their literature beyond French 
Polynesia by stressing a range of concerns shared by peoples around the 
globe. It seems to me that this strategy should be understood in light of 
recent increased contacts and collaborations with writers from around 
the Pacific region, as well as the development of new networks with self-
identifying indigenous peoples outside the area, notably through attending 
conferences. A particular bond has developed among these people. 
Contacts and collaborations have been facilitated by the end of the 
nuclear era in French Polynesia. Participants in my research emphasized 
that regional opposition to “French nuclear colonialism” has had a strong 
effect on the indigenous populations of the French territories of Ocea-
nia, including on their travel and networking. In recent years, the effort 
that has gone into translation, the development of Internet and social 
networks (such as Facebook), and France’s increasing openness to the 
English language has led to new contacts across the great divide between 
francophone and anglophone Oceania. As one example, Chantal Spitz’s 
book L’Île des rêves écrasés (1991), the “first ever novel by an indig-
enous Tahitian writer” (Huia website 2007), was translated into English 
as Island of Shattered Dreams in 2007 by Huia, a Māori publishing com-
pany. The Tahitian novelist has since been invited to several literary book 
fairs and conferences around the Pacific (in New Zealand, Australia, and 
Hawai‘i), along with other self-identifying indigenous writers. Members 
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of Littérama‘ohi were also invited to participate in an anthology of fran-
cophone indigenous writers (Gatti 2008), published in Montréal with the 
support of First Nations organizations. Some members also participated 
in a conference on emerging indigenous literatures that took place in the 
Huron-Wendat First Nation community of Wendake, near Québec city, in 
September 2008 (Gatti and Dorais 2010). 
The following year, a delegation of Mā‘ohi filmmakers, writers, and 
visual artists from the Centre des Métiers d’Arts (cma, Center for the Arts), 
based in Papeete, participated in the nineteenth Montréal First Peoples’ 
Festival / Festival Présence Autochtone. According to the cma director, 
the trip to Montréal—the first trip overseas in the school’s history—was a 
“mind-opener” to “indigenous commonalities,” which encouraged them 
to organize a subsequent trip to New Zealand to meet Māori artists. The 
local media coverage of the event is a good illustration of people’s lack of 
familiarity with indigenous issues and the word autochtone. For example, 
a reporter explained that the Festival Présence Autochtone was an “eth-
nic minorities festival” (Wong 2009)—a designation that shows misun-
derstanding and most probably a lack of awareness about the important 
distinction (which exists throughout the former British colonial empire) 
between First Nations peoples, the descendants of the first inhabitants 
who were colonized by the settler state, and ethnic minorities, who arrived 
later as immigrants. 
This anecdote is illuminating in that it shows how the distinction is 
irrelevant within the French framework. The reporter’s lack of awareness 
makes sense within the larger historical and political context of the French 
Republic, which, unlike Canada, has largely ignored indigenous reality as 
defined by the United Nations in its own territory. A fundamental point 
about the UN category “indigenous” is that it inherently contains claims 
for collective rights. In the French context, the difficulty with collective 
rights was evident in the French representative’s ambiguous position dur-
ing debates prior to the vote on the Declaration on the Rights of Indige-
nous Peoples by the Human Rights Council in 2006. France supported the 
declaration while knowing that, at the national level, it “would have legal 
difficulties” in terms of enforcement. The French representative argued 
that “since French law is based on the indivisibility of the Republic, the 
equality principle and its corollary, the principle of non-discrimination, 
collective rights cannot prevail over individual rights” (ohchr 2006). 
Trépied offered the following clarification: “Already in 1991, the French 
constitutional court, invoking the Republic’s indivisibility, condemned 
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the famous reference to the ‘Corsican people, a component of the French 
people.’ Similarly, the state only recognizes ‘overseas populations’ (see the 
constitutional revision of March 28, 2003) and, among them, ‘indigenous 
populations’ . . . older references to ‘overseas peoples’ included in the 
preamble to the 1946 constitution (relating [to] the French Union) and 
article one of the 1958 constitution (relating to the Communauté, a tem-
porary union established between France and its former colonies) not-
withstanding” (2012b).
Another key problem with the UN category “indigenous” in the French 
constitutional framework is the fact that it considers the right of self-
determination as meaning “indigenous autonomy” or “indigenous self-
government” (Henriksen 2001). In the context of the French Republic, 
these forms of power sharing based on the collective rights of a people 
within the community of French citizens have no precedent. Even in the 
case of New Caledonia, where an exception to the indivisibility of the 
French Republic already exists—“by virtue of the Nouméa Accord, which 
has been integrated into title XIII of the constitution (articles 76 and 77), 
the Republic officially recognizes the existence of a ‘Kanak people’ in New 
Caledonia” (Trépied 2012b)—negotiations about power sharing take 
place between the French state and the local government, that is, New 
Caledonia as a whole. 
As Trépied underlined (2012b), however, the exception served the 
French government well when it was called to reply to the 2011 Report on 
the Situation of Kanak People in New Caledonia by James Anaya, UN spe-
cial rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples. It was also to the ben-
efit of the groups who rallied for their rights as autochtones, in particular 
in the conflicts around mining activities and environmental issues but also, 
more generally, in issues around the protection of cultural customs. By 
virtue of the Nouméa Accord, the French Republic specifically recognized 
“Kanak identity” and provided for the creation of the Customary Sen-
ate, which “must be consulted on subjects related to Kanak identity,” as 
well as a specific regime of civil law—the customary civil  status (a legacy 
of the colonial “particular civil status”; see Trépied 2012b)—alongside 
the “ordinary” regime of civil rights. Over time, the Customary Senate 
has initiated a series of measures concerning the promotion of customary 
rights and has become the foundation of indigenous movements in New 
Caledonia, which have succeeded in making some significant gains (see, 
eg, Demmer 2007; Lafargue 2010).
On this matter, French Polynesia’s history differs from that of New Cale-
donia, since there is no such official recognition of Polynesian or Mā‘ohi 
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customs or of any kind of official “customary status” for the descendants 
of the indigenous people (for details, see Saura 2001). In addition to dif-
ferences in timing, this could help shed light on why the major environ-
mental concerns raised by nuclear testing in French Polynesia—in con-
trast with those provoked by the new mining project of the 2000s in New 
Caledonia—have not worked as a catalyst for the formation of a strong 
indigenous movement. This could also explain the very limited success of 
people like Joinville Pomare (a descendant of the Pomare family, which 
reigned over Tahiti at the time when France took control of what is today 
French Polynesia), whose demands, inspired by the Kanak situation and 
discussions with Kanak leaders, have centered on customs and the reestab-
lishment of customary institutions, as discussed later in this section. 
In practice, however, there is one important exception. Although land-
ownership falls under the French Civil Code, which formally prevents joint 
ownership by extended families, in practice the Mā‘ohi traditional legal 
system still prevails in this area: 80 percent of the land outside urban zones 
is still collectively owned (Bambridge and Ghasarian 2002, 168–169). 
This situation—which has led to serious land problems—is the result of 
difficulty in implementing land registration. The land tenure question has 
been central to Joinville Pomare’s campaign and to Tahiti-based associa-
tions under his leadership. These associations want land titles clarified and 
compensation procedures put in place for victims of land confiscations. 
They also ask that France respect “the treaties for the protectorate and 
annexation of 1842 and 1880, which guaranteed the protection of the 
royal family’s land and land ownership for all Tahitians” (Saura 2010, 
171). Pomare and his supporters have often couched their claims in a lan-
guage that is somewhat foreign to the French “mould” but is widely used 
by indigenous peoples of the former British Empire (such as the Māori 
of New Zealand), with emphasis placed on respect for the foundational 
treaties that allowed the colonial takeover. This importance given to trea-
ties has also been central to the work of Mareva Neti de Montluc who, 
as mentioned earlier, attended the unpfii in New York in 2007, at which 
time she called on the French government to reexamine the validity of the 
“Treaty of 1880” (UN 2007). 
In 2005, Joinville Pomare announced the creation of a traditional royal 
council, putting forward a proposal in Paris for a local senate based on 
local customs. He was inspired in part by the Kanak Customary Senate, 
“which would be given the task of offering to be an arbitrator or mediator 
in land disputes and of giving its opinion in the elaboration of the rules of 
laws” (quoted in Saura 2008, 446). In 2006, he founded the chieftainship 
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of Teva i Tai and appointed judges for the great chieftainships of Tahiti 
and the archipelagos. In 2007, he was behind the assembly of the “mon-
archs” of what is known as the Polynesian triangle to restore ancestral 
links and draw attention to France’s non-respect of its commitments on 
matters relating to lands on the marae (ceremonial center) Taputapuātea. 
Māori and Cook Islands representatives attended the assembly (Tahiti 
Presse 2007). In 2009, a great investiture ceremony was announced dur-
ing which Joinville Pomare was to be named Pomare XI (Saura 2010). 
This announcement was met with opposition from many members of his 
family who question his claim to the throne and from several associations 
that favor democratic legitimacy—beginning with the ballot box. In gen-
eral, the Mā‘ohi are largely against the restoration of hereditary monarchy 
or chiefdoms, as I heard numerous times during my fieldwork. This oppo-
sition finally prevented the ceremony from being held. The road has thus 
been strewn with obstacles for Joinville Pomare and the associations that 
support him. Nonetheless, at the beginning of 2015, they reiterated their 
intention of taking control of their own destiny, in particular in helping 
Polynesians to regain their lands, through the creation of an indigenous 
customary senate called Pare Mata, which in Tahitian means “The Light-
house” (ltd 2015).
I should mention that Pomare, like some Kanak leaders (Raphaël 
Mapou, for instance, who was at the forefront of Rhéébù Nùù’s action), 
has long been involved in traditional party politics and positioned him-
self as an independentist in the long-standing opposition described in the 
introduction to this article. He has, however, remained a rather marginal 
player in the traditional political field. The exploration of the new “indig-
enous strategy” might have been an avenue for him (and other leaders) 
to make a difference. In 2009, Pomare renewed his engagement with 
party politics and the electoral process, becoming leader of the new Parti 
Indigène Anoanotupu, a native-rights political party that only existed for 
a few months. Note that, in contrast, in New Caledonia the previous year, 
the self-identified indigenous association Rhéébù Nùù presented candi-
dates at the 2008 municipal elections in the southern municipality of Yaté. 
In 2009, foreseeing the provincial elections, the group created the Collectif 
Autochtone pour une Liste Unitaire en Province Sud (Indigenous Collec-
tive for a Unitary Roll in the Southern Province), but by the end of the 
electoral campaign it finally gave its support to the flnks. 
It seems to me that the particularities of local and French contexts dis-
cussed thus far could also, perhaps, shed light on the cautious and often 
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ambiguous stance of Richard Tuheiava and his use of the “indigenous 
strategy.” At the end of 2011, Tuheiava (a Polynesian and member of the 
French Senate) published a book of interviews with journalist Serge Mas-
sau, with the provocative title Paroles d’un autochtone (In the Words of 
an Indigenous Man; 2011). In this book, Tuheiava discussed his views on 
decolonization (among other things) and insisted on the necessity of tak-
ing into account the particularities of Polynesian culture—the indigenous 
culture. These include Polynesian values of hospitality and solidarity as 
well as the ancestral obligations and responsibilities attached to them, par-
ticularly with respect to environmental and heritage preservation. Some 
passages related to indigeneity are illustrative. Speaking of his childhood, 
Tuheiava said: “Looking back, my older brother and I had the privilege of 
benefiting, on one hand, thanks to my father, from a strict education cen-
tered on the language and the culture, therefore on indigeneity [autochto-
nie in the original], and, on the other hand, from the learning of worldli-
ness, thanks to my mother, who has English blood and an outstanding 
flair for human relations” (Massau 2011, 25). 
When asked about Marae Taputapuātea, which he described as “a cen-
ter for Polynesian-ness, a center for indigeneity,” he said: “For me, this site 
represents the archetype of how we have shaped our cosmology, how a 
whole people have gathered around the values, the rules . . . how a whole 
people have united around a vision of the universe at a given time. . . . this 
type of site draws on concepts that are far from Western ones” (Massau 
2011, 44–45).
In Tuheiava’s book of interviews, references to indigeneity and indig-
enous rights are primarily, if not uniquely, about the promotion, pres-
ervation, and sustainability of his people’s cultural specificities and 
worldviews. It is important to mention that, under his leadership, Marae 
Taputapuātea has appeared since 2010 on the tentative list of “proper-
ties” that France considers suitable for registration on the unesco World 
Heritage List. In 2012, Tuheiava also coauthored an article in unesco’s 
journal World Heritage, alongside two Māori representatives (Te Heu-
heu, Kawharu, and Tuheiava 2012). The article is the introduction to a 
special issue entitled World Heritage and Indigenous Peoples “devoted 
to the enduring relationship between a number of World Heritage sites 
and the indigenous peoples that inhabit them” (World Heritage 2012, 3). 
The essay discusses the concept of “indigeneity” and the new possibili-
ties it offers in terms of identification, management, and preservation of 
world heritage. 
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When it comes to issues of “real power,” however—that is, decoloni-
zation and sovereignty—Tuheiava, as we’ve seen, does not appeal to the 
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples; nor has he, to my 
knowledge, participated in the unpfii. Instead, he makes himself heard 
at the UN Special Committee on Decolonization. After all, as emphasized 
by Roger Maaka and Augie Fleras, “Indigenous politics are animated by 
a logic to de-colonise from ‘within’” (2005, 41)—they are about internal 
aspects of the right to self-determination. 
Conclusion
Although the word autochtones (indigenous) is used more frequently today 
among Mā‘ohi and Kanak people, and the “indigenous strategy” has made 
some gains in specific circumstances, most self-identified indigenous groups 
and indigenous claims or discourses are still situated in the margins of the 
political arena. In New Caledonia, however, this is less and less the case: 
there, the Nouméa Accord and its implementation since 1998 have paved 
the road for indigenous politics. While this article demonstrates the benefits 
that the indigenous strategy could have, it also shows that it can be a source 
of discomfort. This echoes an idea that Marie Salaün and I put forward pre-
viously: “any discussion of indigeneity and the way that people represent 
themselves as indigenous must be analyzed with a strong focus on social and 
political contexts” (Gagné and Salaün 2012, 389). This also illustrates that 
those who still “believe that one’s political genesis begins with one’s bio-
logical history” (Hokowhitu 2013, 362) are proven to be wrong. Indigene-
ity is largely relational and finds its way (or doesn’t) into specific contexts 
of struggle. As I have tried to show here through the exploration of specific 
examples, the framework for the struggles of the indigenous peoples of the 
French territories in Oceania differs radically from those of other groups 
who have been seen as emblematic of the  category “indigenous peoples,” 
such as the Amerindians, the Māori of New Zealand, and the Aborigines 
of Australia. Specifically, this framework is characterized by the particulari-
ties of French national political history and by the demographic weight of 
indigenous populations in the territories concerned. Specific contexts of 
struggle have profound repercussions. I believe that one of the strengths of 
anthropology is found precisely in its ability to shed light on the practical 
implications of the kinds of circumstances that guide people in their self-
identification and choice of political strategy. 
* * *
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Notes 
1 Some anthropologists have also voiced strong opposition to indigenous poli-
tics (among others, Geschiere 2009; Kelly and Kaplan 2001; Amselle 2010). In 
both cases, the positioning is often ideological and preempts a detailed empirical 
analysis of contemporary appeals to indigeneity—or its refusal—on the ground 
and in particular contexts. 
2 An important distinction exists between the two meanings of “indigeneity”: 
one denotes a universal category based on ancient usage; the other—which is the 
subject of this article—is a specific term referring to a political and identity cate-
gory as well as a legal category defined under international law, largely under UN 
supervision, since the end of the 1970s. No matter what language it is expressed 
in, the “universal” concept of “indigeneity” has been used throughout history 
to mark the difference between those who originate from “here” and those who 
came from “elsewhere”—immigrants. The distinction has a long history in Ocea-
nia, including among Mā‘ohi and Kanak people (see, eg, Bensa 2009; Sahlins 
1985; Saura 2004, 2008). 
3 All translations of excerpts from interviews and written documents from the 
French are my own. Pseudonyms are used to identify research participants.
4 The Établissements Français de l’Océanie (the former name of French Poly-
nesia) were put on the UN list for the first time in 1946, along with New Caledo-
nia, but both territories were removed from the list in 1947 under pressure from 
the French government.
5 For a summary of what happened in the months leading up to and following 
the General Assembly’s resolution, through 31 May 2013, see Maclellan 2013. 
6 This category was completely new in the 2009 census (see Muckle and 
Trépied 2014).
7 For an English summary of the content of the Nouméa Accord, see Maclel-
lan 1999. In 1988, the Matignon Accords provided a ten-year transition period 
with a referendum on self-determination scheduled before the end of 1998. A 
negotiation finally led to the Nouméa Accord, which postponed the referendum 
for at least fifteen years.
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8 This percentage comes from the 1988 census, the last census to measure 
ethnic identity. According to this census, about 12 percent of the population is of 
European origin and about 5 percent is Asian, mainly of Chinese origin.
9 Flosse was president of French Polynesia from 1982 to 1987, from 1991 to 
2004, for a few months between October 2004 and March 2005, and again from 
23 February 2008 to 15 April 2008 (see epf 2013). He was reelected in May 
2013 and then removed from office as French Polynesia’s president in September 
2014 for a conviction of corruption. He was also removed from his seat in the 
French Senate. 
10 For historic reasons, autochtone is the preferred term in French since the 
word indigène is directly associated with the legal status assigned to the sub-
jects—in contrast with the citizens—of the French colonial empire. For a discus-
sion on the uses by various actors in local, national, and international contexts 
of the two distinct yet closely interrelated concepts of “indigeneity” and “autoch-
thony,” in particular in relation to Africa, see Pelican 2009 and Gausset, Kenrick, 
and Gibb 2011.
11 This is very striking in the French social sciences. A decade ago, there was 
nothing resembling a research field called “indigenous studies,” even though 
researchers have been doing research among indigenous populations of the Amer-
icas, Africa, and Oceania for a long time. Those who had looked specifically at 
the UN initiatives and who framed their research around the concepts of peuples 
autochtones (indigenous peoples) and autochtonie (indigeneity) were exceptions 
(on this situation, see Gagné and Salaün 2009). Since then, however, research 
initiatives around those concepts have multiplied. 
12 The first session was held in May 2001.
13 “Hiti Tau literally means ‘Stand up and make a change.’. . . Its mission was 
to bring together the indigenous Maohi people in their struggle for the recogni-
tion of their universal rights, sustainable development and the right to a non-
nuclear homeland” (Peace Boat 2005).
14 Françoise Morin and Bernard Saladin d’Anglure, pers comm, Sept 2013. 
See also Morin 2008.
15 An analysis of the local media coverage of the event that I conducted con-
firmed this statement.
16 Note that in recent years, the extreme right in metropolitan France has 
used the term autochtones in an entirely different sense to express anti-immi-
gration positions, distinguishing two classes of citizens: those who are of French 
(ethnic) origin—the autochtones—and those who are not. This infringes on the 
French Republican principle of equality of citizens. 
17 In French Polynesia, questions pop up from time to time concerning the 
delicate situation of the Chinese minority and whether they could be considered 
autochtones natifs or autochtones de souche considering their long and at times 
painful history in French Polynesia. Similar questions have arisen in New Caledo-
nia concerning other minority populations. 
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Abstract
In French Polynesia and New Caledonia, the “indigenous strategy” in reference 
to the world indigenous movement and UN indigenous rights instruments is a 
relatively new one in the struggle to recover sovereignty. Individuals and volun-
teer associations only began to explore the possibilities of this strategy in the mid-
1990s, and it continues to hold a marginal place in the political field of the French 
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territories in Oceania. This article explores how indigeneity and indigenous rights 
are understood and enacted locally, drawing on local voices and actions within 
a local and national context. It shows how the framework for the struggles of 
the indigenous peoples in the French territories in Oceania differs radically from 
those of other peoples who have been seen as emblematic of the category “indig-
enous peoples.” 
keywords: French Polynesia, New Caledonia, indigenous peoples, indigeneity, 
decolonization, sovereignty, political strategy
